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26-1-3-306 (West 1980 & Supp.
1990), to the Lenders.
The court observed that the Students' claims were based on Adelphi's alleged fraudulent activities.
Some claims referred to specific
instances of fraud while others
pointed to a breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence contingent on
Adelphi's alleged fraudulent activities. In addition, other purported
facts, if proven, would have suggested fraud on the part of Adelphi.
According to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b), a plaintiff's claim
of fraud must include particular
statements and actions alleged to
be fraudulent as well as the reasons
why the statements or actions are
fraudulent. In this case, the Students did not charge the Lenders
with any specific wrongful actions.
Hence, the court found that the
Students failed to meet the particularity standard required by Rule
9(b).
Although the Students did not
charge the Lenders with any
wrongful conduct, the Students
proposed that the claims against
Adelphi should be attributed to the
Lenders because of the "close connection" between the two. Adelphi
had chosen the Lenders, used their
preprinted forms, and represented
the Students in all dealings with
the Lenders. The Students suggested that this connection constituted
an "origination relationship."
Such a relationship exists when a
lender allows a school to execute
many of the lender's responsibilities associated with the making of
loans, such as completing loan
forms normally completed by the
lender. 34 C.F.R. § 682.200 (1989).
The Students argued that an origination relationship may serve as a
defense to the nonpayment of
loans if a school does not render
educational services. The Students
claimed that the "origination relationship" between Adelphi and the
Lenders precluded repayment of
the loans to the Lenders since
Adelphi failed to provide the Students with an education.
However, for these defenses to
apply, the court of appeals noted
that the loans must have been
Federal Insured Student Loans,
Federal PLUS loans, or other loans
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guaranteed by the federal government. The loans in the present case
were not federally guaranteed.
Rather, they were guaranteed by
the Lenders which were state and
private institutions. Thus, the Students' "origination relationship"
argument could not stand.
The Students then attempted to
hold the Lenders liable for charges
against Adelphi under the FTC
rule on the preservation of consumer defenses. The FTC rule
states that consumer credit contracts must contain a stipulation
informing holders of such contracts that they are subject to all of
the debtor's claims and defenses
against the seller of goods and
services. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1991).
However, loans made, issued or
guaranteed under the HEA, as the
loans were in this case, were exempt from the FTC rule. Thus, the
FTC rule did not apply to the
Students' claims.
Finally, the students argued that
they were eligible to recover under
the Indiana Code provision referring to liabilities of assignees and
assignors. Ind. Code. Ann. §§
26-1-3-306 (West 1980 & Supp.
1990). Under the Code, an assignee of an instrument who is not a
holder in due course is subject to
defenses raised against the assignor. However, the court found that
the Indiana Code was irrelevant in
this case since the Lenders were
never assignees of Adelphi but instead were the original holders of
the notes.
Because the Students failed to
show that the Lenders were liable
for Adelphi's actions, the court
affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim.
The court noted, however, that the
students had not exhausted their
remedies. The Department of Education had issued student loan
write-off procedures following the
decision of the district court. In
addition, the students could file
bankruptcy claims and assert state
defenses if sued in state court for
collection of the student loans.
Elizabeth A. Graber

Third-Party Contractual
Risks Not Covered By
Builder's Risk Insurance
Policy
In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 916 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1990),
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that a
builder's risk insurance policy did
not cover arbitration costs awarded against the policyholder to correct faulty workmanship. The
court also found that the policy did
not cover contractual risks agreed
upon by a policyholder and a third
party.
Background
In December, 1980, Halter Marine, Inc. ("Halter"), which Trinity
Industries, Inc. ("Trinity") acquired prior to judgment, agreed to
build six supply boats for Learn
Transportation, Inc. ("Leam").
The contract included a warranty
for workmanship and provided for
arbitration in the event of any
dispute between the parties. The
contract also required that Halter
carry hull, P & I, and builder's risk
insurance. The Insurance Company of North America ("INA") provided insurance under a policy that
listed Halter and Leam as co-insureds and co-loss payees.
In one of the vessels built, the
M/V LEAM ALABAMA, Halter
misaligned two of the modular hull
sections, creating a "twist" in the
vessel. This twist caused one corner of the vessel to be seven to
twelve inches lower than the other.
Upon receipt of the M/V LEAM
ALABAMA in February 1982,
Leam became aware of the twist
when it had problems trimming
the vessel. In accordance with the
terms of the contract, Learn made a
written complaint and returned the
vessel to Halter for repairs. Claiming that the twist was within shipbuilding standards, Halter refused
to repair the vessel. In July 1983,
Learn filed for arbitration, seeking
$2.3 million in damages and return
of its purchase price. Leam argued
that the twist in the hull made the
vessel useless.
(continued on page 66)
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Almost two years after Leam
first notified Halter of its dissatisfaction with the M/V LEAM ALABAMA, Halter contacted INA.
Halter claimed that its INA builder's risk insurance policy should
cover any arbitration panel award.
INA denied that the policy covered
such awards.
In late 1984, the arbitration panel determined that the twist did not
significantly impede the operation
of the vessel. The panel did find,
however, that the size of the twist
exceeded shipbuilding standards;
Halter had violated the warranty of
workmanlike performance. The
panel awarded Leam $200,000 for
Halter's contract breach, attorney's fees, costs, and arbitrator's
fees.
In January, 1985, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana at New
Orleans affirmed the arbitration
award. One month later, Halter
formally demanded that INA reimburse the company for the arbitration award. INA again denied coverage. Halter then sued INA to
recover the arbitration award and
the legal fees incurred in the arbitration proceedings. Claiming that
INA's refusal of coverage was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, Halter also sought attorneys' fees and statutory penalties
under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
22:658(B) (West Supp. 1985).
Procedural History
The trial court, on cross motions
for summary judgment, held that
the insurance policy covered the
arbitration award. The court tried
three issues: (1) whether INA owed
Halter the legal fees Halter incurred in the arbitration action, (2)
whether the late notice of the claim
adversely affected INA, and (3)
whether INA's refusal of coverage
was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.
After a bench trial, the lower
court found in favor of Halter on
all issues. INA appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
66

The Fifth Circuit's Decision
An all risks insurance policy is
one which creates a special type of
coverage which would extend to
risks not usually covered under
other insurance policies. In this
case, the INA builder's risk policy
"insure[d] against all risks of physical loss of or damage to the subject
matter... here insured."
In its suit against INA, Halter
first argued that the INA builder's
risk policy was an all risks policy.
Accordingly, Halter contended
that the policy should cover costs
stemming from defective workmanship. In addition, Halter argued that the twist in the vessel was
damage, as defined in the insurance policy. Because the arbitration award was based on the twist,
Halter concluded that the INA
policy covered the award.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Halter's argument that the policy covered Halter's costs of repairing the
construction mistakes. The court
noted that while present case law
indicated that some all risks policies covered defective workmanship, such coverage was limited to
cases in which the faulty workmanship had led to an accident affecting the insured structure. The
award granted in each case covered
rebuilding the original structure or
the costs of the accident; the award
did not cover repairing or correcting the defective original design of
the original structure. Because the
twist was negligently built into the
M/V LEAM ALABAMA and not
the result of an accident, the court
rejected Halter's claim that the
twist in the vessel was physical loss
or damage, as defined in the policy.
In addition, the court noted that
Halter did not file the claim to
recover the costs repairing the
twist but rather to recover the costs
of the arbitration award. This fact,
as well as the failure of either Leam
or Halter to file a claim on the
policy for over two years, led the
court to conclude that the parties
did not intend for the builder's risk
policy to cover the costs of repairing the twist.
The court next addressed the
issue of whether reimbursement
for the arbitration award was within the scope of the builder's risk

policy. Because the arbitration
award was based on the twist,
Halter argued that the builder's
risk policy should cover the award.
The court did not accept the idea
that the arbitration award itself fit
the policy's definition of physical
loss or damage or that it qualified
as physical loss or damage to the
vessel. The court thus rejected Halter's claim that the builder's risk
policy should cover the award. The
court noted that the arbitration
award was based on a finding that
the twist represented Halter's
breach of his contractual warranty
to Leam and not on a finding that
the twist was damage to the M/V
LEAM ALABAMA.
Since 1972, INA had provided a
blanket policy at a uniform price
for each vessel built by Halter. The
court determined that because contractual clauses such as warranties
would affect INA's potential liability, INA would have had to consider the individual contract terms for
each vessel insured in order to set
an appropriate premium. The
court found that INA did not know
the contract terms between Halter
and Leam at the time it wrote the
builder's risk policy; INA's uniform policies for all vessels built by
Halter for various buyers indicated
that neither party intended the
policies to include Halter's special
contractual risks with respect to
each vessel. The court therefore
concluded that Halter's contractual risks were beyond the scope of
the builder's risk policy. The court
held that INA was not liable to
Halter for the arbitration award.
Lastly, Halter argued that the
Sue & Labor clause of the builder's
risk policy covered attorney's fees
incurred in the arbitration proceedings. The court found that
Halter had engaged in arbitration
to reduce his contractual liability
rather than to "defen[d], safeguard, or recover[]" the M/V
LEAM ALABAMA, as required by
the policy. The court noted once
again that the policy did not cover
contractual risks; the Sue & Labor
clause did not cover Halter's attorney's fees.
The Fifth Circuit thus reversed
the trial court's decision and held
that the builder's risk policy did
not cover the arbitration award.
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The court also reversed the trial
court's award of statutory penalties
under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
22:658(B) (West Supp. 1985).
Aida M. Alaka

Exclusive Warranties
Failing In Essential
Purpose Do Not Prevent
Consequential Damage
Recovery
In Ragen Corp. v. Kearney &
Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619 (3d
Cir. 1990), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that warranties containing exclusive remedies, which fail in
their essential purpose, do not preclude recovery for consequential
damages under Wisconsin law.
Background
Ragen Corporation ("Ragen")
was a New Jersey manufacturer of
component parts for computers
and nuclear reactors. Since 1955,
Ragen conducted business with
Kearney & Trecker Corporation
("K & T"), a Wisconsin corporation that manufactured high-speed
machining equipment.
In 1976, K & T began manufacturing the MM800, a fully automated machine designed to drill
metal castings. For approximately
two years, K & T discussed the
MM800 with Ragen and submitted
a proposal to Ragen for the sale of
MM800 units in April 1978. The
proposal described the MM800 in
detail and specified the conditions
of the proposed sale.
K & T's proposal stated that the
entire and exclusive warranty for
the MM800 was either (1) repair or
replacement of the defective part
or product; or, at K & T's option,
(2) return of the product and refund of the purchase price. Furthermore, the proposal stipulated
that under no circumstances would
K & T be liable for any consequential damages arising in connection
with the MM800. The proposal
also provided that Wisconsin law
would govern any resulting contracts between K & T and Ragen.
Ragen sent purchase orders to K
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& T for eight MM800 machines. In
January, 1979, K & T installed the
first two MM800 units at Ragen's
plant. Soon thereafter, the
MM800s began to malfunction. In
late 1979, after the installation of
the next two units, Ragen discovered defects in the MM800s.
Pursuant to its warranty, K & T
repaired and serviced the MM800
units at Ragen's plant over the next
five years. However, these efforts
provided only a temporary solution to the problem. Prior to and
after repair, the machines could
not operate at, or near, their capacity.
Along with the MM800 problems, Ragen also experienced difficulties with four Eb/1624 machines. Ragen had previously
purchased these units from K & T,
which retrofitted them to operate
like the MM800. In November
1980, and March 1982, Ragen cancelled orders to purchase other
machines from K & T.
In August 1981, in response to
Ragen's threat to cancel orders for
the remaining MM800 units, K &
T offered to aid Ragen in maintaining an 85% operating capacity
for the MM800s, if Ragen also
agreed to perform preventive
maintenance on the machines. Ragen accepted K & T's proposal and
did not revoke the orders for the
remaining MM800 units. However, by 1982, Ragen realized that K
& T could not sustain the 85%
operating capacity for the MM800
units; Ragen also had not been
maintaining the machines as
agreed. Subsequent negotiations
between the parties failed. Ragen
discontinued business with K & T.
In July 1983, Ragen filed suit
against K & T in the United States
District Court for the District of
New Jersey. Ragen claimed breach
of warranty, design defect, and
fraud against K & T for the
MM800 and retrofitted Eb/1624
units. K & T counterclaimed, contending that Ragen breached the
purchase contracts for machines
other than the MM800s. In its
decision, the district court awarded Ragen compensation only for
direct damages resulting from K &
T's breach of warranty. Additionally, the court rejected K & T's
counterclaim. Both parties ap-

pealed the court's verdict to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.
The District Court's Opinion
The district court first determined the parties' contractual
rights and liabilities. Using the
terms contained in K & T's proposal, the district court concluded that
Ragen's contractual remedy was
limited to repair or replacement of
the defective machines; the contract explicitly excluded recovery
for any consequential damages.
The court held that this explicit
exclusion was not unconscionable.
Next, the district court addressed Ragen's breach of warranty claim. The court agreed with
Ragen's claim that the MM800s
suffered from design defects which
constituted a breach of warranty.
Therefore, the contract entitled
Ragen to seek the repair or replacement of the MM800s. However,
since K & T was unable to repair
adequately or replace the defective
MM800 units, the court found that
the limited remedy failed in its
essential purpose. Consequently,
in order to provide an appropriate
remedy, the district court decided
to apply section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").
Section 2-719 allows a court to
apply any remedy available under
the UCC for a contract breach,
such as Ragen's, whose limited
warranty failed in its essential purpose. Using this rule, the court
concluded that the only remedy
Ragen could pursue was section
2-714(2), UCC § 2-714(2) (1989),
which allowed Ragen to recover
direct damages amounting to the
difference in value between the
MM800 units as received and the
MM800 units as warranted. Although Ragen failed to submit evidence showing the difference in
value between the MM800s as received and the MM800s as warranted, the district court awarded
Ragen damages based on its own
estimate of direct damages.
The district court did not address Ragen's fraud claims against
K & T. Also, due to apparent
confusion concerning machine
identities, it is unclear whether the
court decided the claims concern(continued on page 68)
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